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There are apparent differences between the developed North and the economically
weak South. The relations between the North and South are marked by dichotomies
and in order to deal with the challenges posed by the South, the North choses
control and cooperation. The North uses several instruments including economic
assistance to achieve its objectives. One of the new tools that is increasingly taken
advantage of is human rights. Although there exists a genuine concern about
human rights standards in the South, action on these issues almost always depends
on national interest of the states in the North. This paradigm is proved true by the
present human rights campaign the United States is undertaking against Sri Lanka in
the United Nations Human Rights Council. The US and its Western allies believe that
serious human rights violations have been committed during the last phase of the
war in Sri Lanka. Promoting accountability and insisting on an international
investigation, the US has successfully presented three resolutions on Sri Lanka since
2012. This paper argues that the US action is motivated primarily by its national
interest. At the secondary level the US is interested in curtailing what is called the
Sri Lanka model of conflict resolution and promoting reconciliation.Introduction
Sri Lanka’s ethnic war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the
armed forces of the state needs no introduction. It was one of the most prominent and
well-studied ethnic conflicts of the last century. Following the ethnic riots of 1983 where
the minority ethnic Tamils were attacked and brutalized, the international community
evolved sympathetic to the political cause of the Tamils, despite the fact that overt
support for a separate state, the fundamental demand of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, was
lacking. As the LTTE’s reliance on violence to win its political demands intensified, the
international community, especially the West, began to see the rebels as terrorists. Sri
Lanka demanded proscription of the LTTE as a terrorist organization and many states
including the United States complied. Antipathy towards the Tamil struggle and the
LTTE deepened with the collapse of the peace process in 2006. The LTTE, not without
reason, was seen as the primary source of the breakdown of the peace talks. Most of the
Northern states turned friendly towards the Sri Lankan state and began to assist its
military campaign against the LTTE in the belief that termination of the LTTE would lead
to peace and reconciliation. With the able support and approval of many of the states
both in the Global North and the South, the Sri Lankan government successfully crushed
the LTTE in 2009 bringing the violent phase of the conflict to a conclusion. The
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human rights.
However, the jubilation did not last long. Some of the Northern states turned hostile
towards Sri Lanka based on reports of serious human rights violations allegedly
committed by the state armed forces and so far, three resolutions have been successfully
introduced in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) promoting accountability,
through an international investigation, which is seen by Sri Lanka as an assault on its
sovereignty. This paper raises the question, why the United States, which assisted
Sri Lanka during the final stages of the war, currently leads a campaign in the UNHRC
against the country. The question has been examined through the lenses of North-South
relations and the role of human rights on this relation. In addition to secondary data,
primary information was collected from journalists and political figures who attend the
annual UNHRC sittings in Geneva since 2012.
Literature on the nexus between foreign policies of the North and human rights clearly
demonstrates that the North has a tendency to use human rights as a political tool.
Although there has been a genuine concern about human rights in the South, one cannot
underestimate the interconnection between human rights slogans of the North and their
national security and or interest. This paper argues that the United States led the
campaign against Sri Lanka in the UNHRC primarily based on its strategic and national
interest considerations. The following section on North-South relations argues that the
North traditionally used different tools including monetary aid to preserve the hegemonic
relations with the South and currently human rights have become one of the new
weapons in the arsenal. The next section on human rights deals with the way ideals of
human rights have been incorporated into the foreign policies of leading members of the
North and the nexus between human rights slogans and national interest. The rest of the
paper explores the Sri Lankan human rights issue in the UNHRC and the motives behind
the American involvement.
North-South relations and dichotomies
Despite the refusal of some commentators to believe that a “divide” exists between the
South and the North, a vast majority of analysts and researchers agree that following the
evaporation of clashes between the East and the West, South – North relations are at a
turning point (European Communities 1998). There has been a general agreement that
North and South are different in nature and characteristics and the relations between the
North and the South are being marred, overtly and subtly, by disagreements and tension
at least on some of the critical international issues. There has always been a disparity
between the states of the North and the South largely due to colonial past and nature and
structure of the international system established after the end of the Second World War.
Lees (2012) for example, argues that these inequalities are caused by what he calls “deep
structure” of the international system (p. 209). Some of the states in the Global South are
currently emerging as powerful international entities and are beginning to possess capacity
to challenge the predominance of the Northern states in the international system. China,
India and Brazil are some of the cases in point (Mickelson 2009). This certainly is one
reason why relations between the North and South are becoming intense and the Global
South is beginning to capture the attention of powerful states and international
commentators.
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defining the North and South precisely has not been an easy task. The nomenclature
indicates that these are geographical entities. As McDougall (2011) points out, “Global
South is more geographically based, referring to the position of Africa, Asia and Latin
America” (p. 361). Arguing that North-South categorization lacks a high level of
homogeneity, Reuveny and Thompson (2007) point out “the dichotomy works as long as
no one assumes a high degree of homogeneity in the two zones. If one places the North
Pole at the top of one’s globe, most less developed states are located in the south of most
of the more developed and affluent states” (p. 557). However, as McDougall (2011) rightly
indicates, theorizing the South as a geographical entity “requires qualification in relation
to the location of Australia and New Zealand” as they lack the characteristics of typical
states of the South (p. 362). One of the defining features of the South, according to
McDougall (2011, 362) is low to middle per capita income of these countries. Australia
and New Zealand for example are not low or middle income countries. It is therefore
clear that North and South cannot be defined merely by geography alone.
North and South are essentially socio-political and economic entities. Therefore, they
are increasingly being defined by their development status. Horowitz (1996) for example,
called the North, “industrialized” and wealthy and the South, “under-developed”
(Horowitz 1996, 3). He argued that “there is a marked divergence in economic conditions
and standards of living between the industrialized and the less developed countries of the
world” (p. 3). Pointing to the divergence within these categories Mickelson (2009) argues
that “while there have always been problems with seeing the Global South as some kind
of monolith, it is certainly possible to argue that it no longer makes any sense to speak of
‘the south’ when countries like China, India and Brazil appear to be in a completely
different category and therefore, need to be treated in a different way” (p. 418). Defining
the North-South divide in terms of economic development has led to the conception that
the South is inherently problematic and entails several weaknesses. According to Maggie
Black (2007), countries needing development have several shortcomings (Quoted in Weiss
2009, p. 272). Calling North the “well-off” and the South “less well-off” and “poor and
malnourished”, Reuveny and Thompson (2007) point out that the North sees several
problems in regards to the South. They contend that “there are, of course, all sorts of
concerns” but the main issues involve violent conflicts, need for external intervention,
nuclear proliferation, migration pressures, infectious disease, environmental degradation,
global warming, and over-population (Reuveny and Thompson 2007: 558). It is imperative
to note that the above list is symptomatic of some of the negative stereotype that exists
within the North about the South, which is also a part of the dichotomy.
In addition to the problem the North sees in the South and the fact that some of the
states of the South are emerging as key international players with considerable clout
creates added pressure on the North. This problem is no more evident than in climate
change politics and negotiations. As Hurrell and Sengupta (2012) point out “…the story of
the Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009 has been used as a vignette to
capture this power shift, with the BASIC group of countries (Brazil, South Africa, India
and China) sidelining Europe in climate change negotiations and forcing the United States
to negotiate within a very different institutional context. Moreover, if emerging powers
are seen as increasingly influential and important players, their rise is also commonly
viewed as having made an already difficult problem still more intractable” (p. 463).
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problematic because, first, the rising powers will seek to alter the status quo. Second, they
challenge the Western understanding of legitimacy, fairness, and responsibility. Third,
“emerging powers are a problem not just because of their high growth rates and rapid
development but also because of the increasingly central role that they are playing within
a global capital system” (p. 465). According to Ibrahim Elnur (2003), the gap between the
North and South is still widening, not narrowing.
These realities unavoidably create inconsistencies and tension between the North and
the South leading to serious disagreements on a multitude of issues. For example, as Jacob
and Linner (2005) maintain, “one of the persistent trends of major international
environmental negotiations…has been the emergence of irreconcilable differences
between the North and South” (p. 403). The North and the South disagree on a range of
issues from cause of global warming to climate change policy to terrorism. This doesn’t
mean that they could act independently as they are in a way interdependent on each other
(European Communities 1998). The terms of the relationship, or the agenda, so to speak,
is set by the North or the powerful Western states. The North chose control of and or
cooperation with, states of the South in order to deal with the challenges posed by the
South and to achieve their national interest. Development aid, military pressure, and
diplomatic interventions are some of the traditional tools used to ensure powerful states’
interest vis-à-vis the South (Ayoob 2007; Haider 2011). Since the recent past however, the
North is beginning to take advantage of new tools. Bessa (2009) for instance, argues that
the North has currently redefined resettlement of refugees “as an exclusive protection tool
and instrument of international cooperation” (p. 91). Another newly emerged or emerging
instrument certainly is human rights as the West is increasingly using human rights as a
foreign policy tool.
Human rights and foreign policy
Traces of the link between foreign policy of major states and human rights could be found
in the political history of Europe a few centuries ago. Yet, the nexus between these two
subjects became prominent since the mid-seventies and the early eighties. The West,
especially the United States of America and the United Kingdom, obviously led the
campaign for greater human rights standards in the Third World countries or the South
since this period. Forsythe (2002) confirms that human rights became a “fixture” on the
US foreign policy and international agenda since the mid-1970s (p. 501). Robin Cook
(2002), former Member of Parliament of the United Kingdom, in a commentary claimed
that “on taking office as Foreign Secretary in 1977, I placed the promotion and protection
of human rights at the heart of the new Labor government’s foreign policy” (p. 45). Other
European countries also currently pay particular attention to human rights and have
incorporated ideals of human rights into their domestic policies as well as their relations
with other countries.
President Jimmy Carter was instrumental in turning the US foreign policy firmly
towards human rights and democracy in what the North considers problematic areas. As
pointed out by Schmitz and Walker (2004), “from the first day of his presidency, Jimmy
Carter set out to fundamentally alter the direction of American foreign policy. Coming to
office in the wake of the disillusionment brought about by the Vietnam War, Watergate,
and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Church Committee) revelations on
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direction to American foreign policy by shaping it around the principles of human
rights and nonintervention” (p. 113). In 1977 the Carter administration developed a
comprehensive policy framework that made human rights the central component of the
American foreign policy (Schmitz and Walker 2004). Yet, even Carter could not
promote human rights at the expense of national interest and his own political survival.
It is imperative to note that Carter’s foreign policy was criticized especially in the United
States as weak and naïve. Implying that security and national interest are fundamental,
Carter in 1977 declared that “human rights cannot be the only goal of our foreign
policy, not in a world in which peace is literally a matter of survival” (Quoted in
Forsythe 1980, 38).
This however, did not mean that America gave up on its human rights centered foreign
policy entirely, as it is one of the corner stones of American foreign policy now (Forsythe
2002). A firm commitment however to what is generally called the “ethical foreign policy”
is missing. It is pointed out that “while the United States has long embraced human rights
and democracy as ideological values, in times of conflict such values may be eclipsed by
the demand of security” (Blanton 2005, 649). For example, “the Carter administration has
directed more diplomacy to criticizing the Soviet violations of human rights than the
Chinese violations” because “the United States had important security interests with the
Soviet (Union)…and far more economic interests in Russia than in China” during the
Cold War (Forsythe 1980, 43). During the Cold War the United States also extended
military and financial support, which also included transfer of weapons to regimes with
questionable human rights records and authoritarian tendencies if they were useful
instruments to counter security threat from the Soviet Union (Blanton 2005).
Nevertheless, human rights slogans were also used against the Soviet Union as a useful
tool. The Western powers “saw human rights issues as a stick with which to beat the
Soviet Union to lessen its appeal to their own citizens and thus curb its influence. Like all
Wars of attrition, superpower competition during the Cold War was based not only on
establishing military, economic, territorial and political supremacy over the enemy but
was also delegitimizing the adversary’s political system by assuming the moral high
ground” (Pedaliu 2007, 186).
Many of the European states have also committed to better human rights standards
around the world and inclined to use human rights as a foreign policy tool. Member states
of the European Community, through the Copenhagen Declaration proclaimed their
determination to “defend” the principles of representative democracy, rule of law, social
justice and human rights (King 1999). It is generally believed that the European countries
are more proactive and genuine in terms of ensuring a vibrant HR culture in the South,
compared to for example, the United States. However, even these countries could not
delink human rights concerns from their own national interest considerations. For
example, European commitment to human rights came under severe threat during the
political troubles in Greece in the late 1960s. A military junta came to power through a
coup and relied on repression to stay in power. Commentators pointed out that the
“Western European Governments uncomfortably and silently acknowledged that the Cold
War and the stability of the South-Eastern flank of NATO had to take precedence over
the violation of the democratic process in Greece and decided to treat the whole messy
situation as an internal matter” (Pedaliu 2007, 189).
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countries, could not or was not willing to criticize some of its allies. Evan Luard, a
former Member of Parliament from Oxford who served as a junior minister in the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, believed that the Labor Government which
espoused active human rights promotion “found that Britain’s close economic
investments with South Africa sometimes constrained it to be cautious towards
proposals for international action against that country which might involve economic
sanctions” (Luard 1980, 581). Pointing to the ambiguity of human rights policies of
European states, Forsythe (2002) argues that France, “while presenting itself to the
world as a champion of The Rights of Man and submitting its own policies to the
review of the European Court on Human Rights, has compiled a rather lengthy record
of support for dictatorship in Africa” (p. 501).
Australia, another member of the Global North, hardly defended human rights in the
South largely due to its location in the South and the realities created by geopolitics.
Summing up Australia’s commitment to human rights internationally, Saul (2011)
contends “unlike that of its close ally, the United States, Australian foreign policy since
1945 has never been animated by an equivalent sense of civilizing moral mission and
ideological purpose in the area of human rights” (p. 423). For example, Australia
recognized the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, adopted unreserved friendly
relations with Israel despite its problematic conduct in the occupied territories of
Palestine, and desisted from criticizing China. Australia is keen to preserve cordial
relations and a partnership with China despite its questionable human rights record
due to China’s strategic and economic significance (Mackerras 2000). Another example
is Australia’s relations with Myanmar. According to McGregore (2005), Australian
“governments refrained from publicly criticizing Burma, for example on being governed
by an unelected military regime, on the large number of political prisoners, media
censorship or the ongoing violent civil wars with ethnic minorities” (p. 199). Even on
the allegations of human rights violation during the last phase of the war in Sri Lanka,
Australia opposed an international investigation against Sri Lanka due to its need to
prevent what is generally termed the “boat people”, some of whom were ethnic Tamil,
reaching Australia from Sri Lanka.
Hence, a cursory look at the literature on the linkage between foreign policies of
the states of the North and human rights leads us to conclude that (1) there exists an
ethically and morally based concern about the state of human rights in the less
developed world among most of the Western world, and (2) action on this issue
almost always has been linked to their national security and interest. This linkage has
three dimensions: (1) at times, human rights were used as a weapon against enemy or
unfriendly states in order to achieve national interest of the states of the North, (2)
states of the North resisted the temptation to condemn and or criticize human rights
violations in the South when they had the potential to impede their national interest,
and (3) human rights slogans turn louder when the impact on their national interest
is absent or milder. Currently, the United States is using HR as a tool against Sri
Lanka in order to achieve its strategic interests in the South Asian and the Indian
Ocean regions, while, at the secondary level, trying to promote international peace
and order and the socio-political wellbeing of the minority communities in this
country.
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As pointed out elsewhere in this essay, in May 2009, the UNHRC passed a resolution
commending Sri Lanka for successfully terminating terrorism. It is imperative to note that
this resolution was a result of what could be termed a coup of sorts by states of the South,
which were also friends of Sri Lanka. Although an international euphoria and jubilation
was created by the end of the war, human rights concerns were also raised almost at the
same time by international human rights lobbies. Consequently, some of the European
countries sponsored a resolution on Sri Lanka, which called for an internal investigation
into possible war crimes. The original draft resolution however did not have adequate
backing within the Council and the Sri Lankan lobby wasted no time in presenting its
own counter resolution titled Assistance to Sri Lanka in the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, which was adopted with the approval of 29 states, none of which were part
of the North; they all came from the Global South. These countries held the view that the
Council should not interfere in the internal matters of member states and human rights
should not be used as a political tool against any of the member states. The matter of the
fact is that these countries, unlike the West, never considered human rights as an
important element of foreign policy formulation. Of significance is the fact that the
North-South rivalry on the question of human rights unfolded in Geneva with most of
the Northern states taking a critical view and the Global South defending Sri Lanka. In a
way this rivalry still continues.
One could argue that in 2009, the Northern states were thoroughly defeated by some of
the leading members of the Global South, including China, India and Pakistan. The defeat
of the West-sponsored resolution was seen by human rights advocates and concerned
states as a setback for the wellbeing of the war affected people in Sri Lanka and those who
were in what was popularly called the “welfare camps”, where about 300,000 Tamil people
were interned. A noteworthy fact is that the United States did not play a visible role in the
2009 original resolution against Sri Lanka and it was the European states including
Switzerland, Germany, and the United Kingdom that were in the forefront. One reason
why the US did not play a noticeable role was that the US was in fact assisting Sri Lanka’s
military campaign against the LTTE during the last phase of the war. According to Jeffrey
Lunstead (2011), a former US ambassador to Sri Lanka, the US began to undertake
concrete measures against the LTTE, especially against its international network since the
collapse of the peace process in 2006. For instance, a number of LTTE international
operatives were arrested for various offences linked to assisting the rebels. Lunstead
(2011) pointed out that “although the LTTE had been designated as an FTO (Foreign
Terrorist Organization) in 1997, making material support for it illegal, there were no legal
actions against LTTE supporters until 2006” (p. 67) The US also extended considerable
military assistance to Sri Lanka during this period to boost its military campaign.
Therefore, the US, in the immediate aftermath of the end of the war in 2009, was not
in a position to vehemently criticize or take action against Sri Lanka. As the
international outcry against Sri Lanka intensified and under pressure from the human
rights lobby, the UN began to show interest in the human rights violation related issues
in Sri Lanka. Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary General of the UN, announced the
appointment of a three member group of experts to investigate the alleged human
rights violations and advise him on accountability issues in June 2010. The panel report
titled Report of the Secretary – General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in
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Tamil rebels credible, the panel concluded that
The Panel’s determination of credible allegations reveals a very different version of
the final stages of the war than that maintained to this day by the Government of
Sri Lanka. The Government says it pursued a ‘humanitarian rescue operation’ with a
policy of ‘zero civilian casualties.’ In stark contrast, the Panel found credible allegations,
which if proven, indicate that a wide range of serious violations of international
humanitarian law and international human rights law were committed both by the
Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, some of which would amount to war crimes
and crimes against humanity. Indeed, the conduct of the war represented a grave
assault on the entire regime of international law designed to protect individual dignity
during both war and peace (United Nations 2011, ii).
The panel recommended the establishment of an “independent international mechanism”,
among other objectives, to “conduct investigations independently into the alleged violations”
(p. viii).
This report and especially the recommendation for an international investigation
formed the cornerstone of the future human rights campaign by the United States and
some of its allies against Sri Lanka in the UNHRC. The United States argued that
accountability established through a credible, preferably an international investigation, will
facilitate ethnic reconciliation. Based on this notion, the US has sponsored and managed
to adopt three resolutions on Sri Lanka since 2012. It seems that Sri Lanka and the US
are currently engaged in a serious diplomatic scuffle in the UN Human Rights Council in
Geneva. The first resolution of 2012 called “upon the Government of Sri Lanka to
implement the constructive recommendations made in the report of the Lessons Learnt
and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and to take all necessary additional steps to fulfill
its relevant legal obligations and commitment to initiate credible and independent actions
to ensure justice, equity, accountability and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans.”a The 2013
resolution called upon the Government of Sri Lanka to “conduct an independent and
credible investigation into allegations of violations of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, as applicable.” Based on the assumption that Sri Lanka
has not made adequate progress in addressing accountability issues and promoting
reconciliation, the US-sponsored March 2014 resolution, while repeating the call for
credible investigation by Sri Lanka, requested the Office of the High Commissioner to
“undertake a comprehensive investigation into alleged serious violations and abuses of
human rights and related crimes by both parties in Sri Lanka during the period covered
by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, and to establish the facts and
circumstances of such alleged violations and of the crimes perpetrated with a view to
avoiding impunity and ensuring accountability, with assistance from relevant experts and
special procedures mandate holders.”
Now, since the Office of the High Commissioner (OHC) has been asked to investigate
Sri Lanka, a team headed by international experts has already been appointed by the High
Commissioner for Human Rights and it has commenced work. Sri Lanka, however, since
the inception, refused to cooperate with any mechanism aimed at an international
investigation, although it has demonstrated some degree of flexibility with regards to a
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not be allowed into Sri Lanka. Therefore, one can expect the tussle between Sri Lanka
and the United States on this issue to continue for a while.
The pertinent question here is why the US, which backed the Sri Lankan government
on its war efforts, now criticizes Sri Lanka on alleged human rights violations and
undertakes a relatively robust campaign against its one-time ally. Elsewhere in this paper
we have argued that there exists an ethically and morally-based concern about the state of
human rights in the less developed world among most of the Northern world, and an
action on this issue almost always is linked to national security and interest of the
powerful states. National security and interest take precedence over any other concerns.
The fundamental reason why the US is carrying forward a robust campaign against Sri
Lanka is linked to the American strategic interest in the Indian Ocean region and South
Asia. At the secondary level, the US is motivated by concerns about international peace
and ethnic reconciliation in Sri Lanka. However, the question what changed is vital. The
shift in the American attitude was closely linked to two major post war developments
within Sri Lanka, which the US did not anticipate or desire. First, in the post war period,
Sri Lanka leaned drastically towards China, marginalizing traditional allies like the US and
some of the European states the country. The pro-Chinese tendencies of the Sri Lankan
government are such, opposition parties have begun to claim that Sri Lanka has become a
colony of China. Second, when the US extended military support to the Sri Lankan
government during the last phase of the war, it expected the Sri Lankan government to
introduce political measures to address the legitimate issues of the Tamil community. It
believed that the Sri Lankan government would devolve political powers to the North-
East provinces and work towards ethnic reconciliation. The Sri Lankan government
however did not demonstrate any interest in devolving powers as it believed that the
conflict had been resolved with the decimation of the LTTE. What disappointed the US
the most was that there has been a process of consolidation of majority rule, which only
helped to further polarize ethnic communities. These two factors are critical in
understanding the change of the US policy towards Sri Lanka. The following sections of
this essay discuss three motivating factors behind the American action and agenda.
Strategic interest
A number of commentators erroneously subscribe to the notion that the US has very
limited strategic interest in Sri Lanka. Jeffrey Lunstead (2011) for example points out that
“the degree of engagement and commitment of US attention to the Sri Lankan peace
process since it began in late 2001 has been out of proportion to US interest in Sri Lanka,
where the US has no significant strategic interests.…US military interest in Sri Lanka is
minimal” (p. 54). The problem with this approach is that it looks at Sri Lanka’s
significance to the US in isolation. Sri Lanka is not only a South Asian state but also
located in a strategically significant space in the Indian Ocean. That is why this research
argues that American strategic interest in Sri Lanka should be examined through its
policies and purposes both in South Asia as a region and the Indian Ocean.
South Asia for a long time remained marginal in the US foreign policy schemes
(Kreisberg 1989). Summarizing the state of affairs, Grinter (1993) argued “the United
States does not have vital interests in South Asia. Unlike American interests in the Persian
Gulf, the Caribbean, or in East Asia, where oil, geographic proximity, or enormous trade
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to the United States. The United States, however, can and should place more attention on
South Asia because of its huge size, its location between the oil rich Persian Gulf and the
dynamic East Asia region, and the fact that both Pakistan and India appear to have
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles” (p. 101). For the reasons indicated by Grinter, the
US seems to be paying more attention to South Asia currently. The US Assistant
Secretary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca, in 2005 contended that “President Bush
came to office in 2001 recognizing the growing importance of South Asia to the United
States. He directed that the United States build stronger relationships with all of the
countries in the region” (Rocca 2005, 99). The US Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Nicholas Burns in 2006 declared that “South Asia is now a central focus of US
foreign policy. For the first time in decades the United States views this region as
increasingly vital to our core foreign policy interests” (Burns 2007, 115).
It is however, erroneous to assume that until recently the US did not pay attention to
the region. The US maintained contact with major powers in the region including India,
and tried to keep Pakistan under its sphere of influence through diplomatic as well as
monetary means and it was also involved in major developments in the region. For
instance, during the Indo-Pakistan war over Bangladesh, the US sent a fleet of war ships,
the Seventh Fleet, led by its Aircraft Carrier USS Enterprise in support of Pakistan. The
point is despite the limited US strategic interest in South Asia, the US strived to preserve
what is generally called “primacy” in the region (Mohan 2008). The US not only was keen
to maintain primacy in South Asia but also in the India Ocean region. Holmes and
Yoshihara (2008) in an essay titled China and the United States in the Indian Ocean,
maintain that “lingering questions over the sustainability of American primacy (emphasis
added) on high seas have heightened concerns about the US Navy’s ability to guarantee
maritime stability” in the Indian Ocean (p. 41). Green and Shearer (2012) argued that the
Indian Ocean should figure high on the US strategic priority list due to (1) the need to
“maintain the Indian Ocean as a secure highway for international commerce, particularly
between the oil-rich Gulf States and an economically dynamic East Asia”, (2) the need “to
maintain freedom of navigation through the strategic chokepoints of the Indian Ocean
highway”, and (3) the fact that the Ocean could become an arena for competition between
India and China (p. 178-9).
Sri Lanka is located in a strategically significant place in the maritime lane between the
Middle East and East Asia. Therefore, the US has an interest and presence in Sri Lanka.
In fact one could argue that the US maintained “primacy” in Sri Lanka since its
independence in 1948. The US was one of the major donors to the country until very
recently and still maintains a broadcasting facility (Voice of America) in Sri Lanka. Sri
Lanka was also keen to preserve close and cordial relations with the remaining super
power. One of the consequences of the end of the war was that China’s presence and
influence grew rapidly in Sri Lanka, which has the potential to undermine the US
presence and influence in Sri Lanka and the region. The ever increasing Chinese presence
in Sri Lanka is part of China’s buildup in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region
Keethaponcalan (2015).b The end of the war enabled the Sri Lankan government to adopt
a profoundly pro-Chinese foreign policy, which worries the US. Raja Mohan (2008)
maintains that “American primacy on the Subcontinent is in danger of being
compromised by the steady expansion of Chinese influence in the region” (p. 58).
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the Indian Ocean region. It is safe to argue that the US indeed has already lost its primacy
in Sri Lanka. Without the UN resolution, the super power does not have any say in the
affairs of the small South Asian state. Therefore, through the UNHRC process, the US is
trying to stay relevant in Sri Lanka, which is crucial to preserve its primacy in the Indian
Ocean region and South Asia.
Sri Lankan model of conflict resolution
At the secondary level the US is keen to prevent Sri Lanka from becoming a model for
conflict resolution in terms of internal armed conflicts because it believes that Sri Lanka,
by the way it terminated the war, set a bad example. With the successful elimination of
the LTTE, which hitherto was believed undefeatable militarily, the government of Sri
Lanka and its leadership including the President began to believe and argue that Sri Lanka
has provided a model for the world on how to effectively defeat terrorism. President
Mahinda Rajapaksa, in his address to the Parliament immediately after the military
victory, declared that “Sri Lanka has now given a beginning to the ending of terrorism in
the world.”c The belief that Sri Lanka, with the elimination of the LTTE, has given the
world a “gift” ran deep within the Sinhala polity. For example, Mahinda Amaraweera, a
junior minister in the government in a media interview proclaimed, the “President
showed the world how to defeat terrorism.”d What is imperative to note is that the idea of
a Sri Lankan model of conflict resolution, i.e. how to defeat internal armed resistance
successfully, was catching up regionally and perhaps internationally to a certain extent, as
states like Pakistan and Nepal began to contemplate the Sri Lankan model, in relation to
internal conflicts in their respective countries (Keethaponcalan 2012). Internationally,
several states which are facing internal armed conflicts, showed interest in learning from
the Sri Lankan experience. For example, the Sri Lankan state-sponsored Galle Dialogue,
an international seminar-type annual meeting, currently serves as one of the tools of this
knowledge-sharing project.
What is the Sri Lankan model of conflict resolution? On this question perceptions differ
greatly between domestic and international actors. The Sri Lankan government and its
military leadership believe that at the core of the Sri Lankan model of conflict resolution
is the unwavering determination, especially of the political leadership, to eliminate
terrorism. They also believe that the commitment to civilian safety is one of the integral
elements of Sri Lankan success. This was why the military assault on the LTTE was called
the “humanitarian operation” by the authorities. President Rajapaksa claimed that his
“troops went to this operation carrying a gun in one hand, the Human Rights Charter in
the other”.e
Despite the lack of disagreement on the “will of the political leadership” as a core
component of the Sri Lankan model of conflict resolution, international commentators
believe that the Sri Lankan approach entails broader aspects, some of which are inimical
to international peace and upholding of human rights standards. According to this school
of thought, the fundamental characteristic of the Sri Lankan model is the relentless
military assault on the rebel controlled territories and facilities regardless of the
humanitarian or human rights consequences. For example, Brad Adams, Asia director at
Human Rights Watch (HRW) maintained that “Sri Lanka's self-proclaimed ‘model’ of
counterinsurgency included repeatedly shelling civilians, targeting hospitals, and trying to
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that what they call the Rajapaksa doctrine entailed the following elements; political will,
ignoring international opinion, refusal to negotiate with terrorists, blackout of media and
selective spread of information, complete operational freedom to field commanders, and
obtaining assistance from all possible sources.g It is imperative to note that multi-barrel
rockets were the primary weapon the armed forces used in the last phase of the war
against the LTTE.
Although the West and the US were appreciative of the fact that the Sri Lankan armed
forces managed to terminate the LTTE, they did not like the idea of Sri Lanka becoming a
model for conflict resolution internationally. They believe that it will hinder international
peace. Hence, the UNHRC campaign against Sri Lanka is aimed at preventing Sri Lanka
from becoming an example. The West and the UNHRC believe that crimes against
humanity were committed in Sri Lanka during the last phase of the war. Therefore, they
do not want to see an episode of the Sri Lankan situation repeating itself elsewhere in the
world. Through the UNHRC process, the North has sent a strong message to the Third
World states that are tempted to try the Sri Lankan approach that there will be
consequences. With or without an eventual international investigation, the Sri Lankan
model has effectively been de-legitimized through the Geneva process.
Reconciliation
The other secondary motivation of the US is promoting ethnic reconciliation in
Sri Lanka. The US and its European allies were keen supporters of peaceful resolution
of the conflict and played a vital role in the last peace process. The European Union
was one of the Co-Chairs of the Conference on Reconstruction and Development of
Sri Lanka, which led the international support group for the peace process. The US
was one of the four Co-Chairs of the Conference. The intimate US involvement in the
Sri Lankan peace process led some commentators to argues that it was “out of
proportion” to its strategic interest in the country (Lunstead 2011, 54). As pointed out
elsewhere in this paper, the US wanted to make Sri Lanka a role model for peaceful
conflict resolution and following the collapse of the peace process, backed the
Sri Lankan government in its military campaign against the LTTE in the belief that
termination of the rebels would lead to stable peace and reconciliation. However, the
way in which the war was ended and the post-war developments in this country led
only to further polarization of ethnic communities.
Currently, the American schemes are designed, at least partly, to promote post-war
reconciliation in Sri Lanka. The US conceives the human rights campaign in Geneva
against Sri Lanka as a primary vehicle for peace and reconciliation. American
spokespersons have repeatedly insisted that the US sponsored resolutions are adopted
not “against” Sri Lanka, but as an assistance to promote peace and reconciliation.
Sri Lanka however, firmly believes that these are conspiracies undertaken to sabotage
the country’s progress towards peace as imagined by the people of Sri Lanka. This is
the reason why the government of Sri Lanka mobilized all resources at its disposal to
resist the American campaign. The US intervention promoting an international
investigation however was based on the notion that truth will lead to reconciliation.
The US believes that an “international investigation” on human rights violation by both
parties to the conflict will lead to the “truth”, which in turn will facilitate reconciliation.
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society and polity.
Conclusions
The resourceful, rich and developed North uses different tools to work with and control
states in the Global South. In the recent past however, human rights have emerged as one
of the new tools of foreign policies of the powerful states. A closer look at the use of
human rights as a foreign policy tool indicates that Western states take up human rights
issues in the Third World countries to promote their national interest. Human rights
slogans become louder when they do not adversely affect their national interest despite
the fact that there exists a genuine concern about human rights standards in the
developing world. This concern nevertheless is a secondary factor. Most of the Western
European states and the United States of America assisted and collaborated with the
Sri Lankan state in its war with the LTTE. With the successful completion of the war
however, most of these states, especially the United States, have become hostile to the
government of Sri Lanka on the basis that crimes against humanity were committed by
the warring parties. Sri Lanka’s pro-Chinese foreign policy tendencies and lack of progress
on ethnic reconciliation were two crucial factors which prompted the American action
against Sri Lanka in the UN. Currently, the United States has been leading a human rights
campaign in the United Nations Human Rights Council against Sri Lanka to promote
accountability and reconciliation. This essay argues that this campaign primarily is
motivated by strategic interest of the United States in South Asia and the Indian Ocean
region. Through the UNHRC process, the US is trying to remain relevant in Sri Lanka. At
a secondary level, the US is trying to prevent Sri Lanka from becoming a model for
conflict resolution in terms of internal ethnic conflicts. The US and its Western allies
believe that the approach adopted by Sri Lanka in the final stages of the war will be
inimical to international peace and accepted human rights standards. Thus far the US
strategy in the UNHRC has clearly demonstrated the problems and weaknesses of the Sri
Lankan model of conflict resolution. The Northern states that are challenging Sri Lanka
in the UNHRC also believe that the Geneva process may help transform the socio-
political condition of the minority communities in Sri Lanka leading to ethnic
reconciliation. The present approach allows the US to be relevant in Sri Lankan affairs
and at the same time be critical of the human rights situation. However, if and when there
is a conflict between the primary and secondary motivations American strategic interest
will take precedence over peace and reconciliation, and its policies and attitude towards
Sri Lanka could also transform.
Endnotes
aThe Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) was a local mechanism set
up by the Sri Lankan government to mitigate international criticism on alleged human
rights violations by the Sri Lankan armed forces during the last phase of the war.
Although problematic, the LLRC made a series of recommendations to promote peace
and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Members of the Tamil community viewed these
recommendations as too little too late.
bThis essay entails an in-depth analysis of the causes, nature and characteristics of the
Chinese buildup in Sri Lanka.
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satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/president_speech_parliament_defeatof
LTTE.htm.
dPresident Showed the World How to Defeat Terrorism – Minister Amaraweera, Daily
News, March 26, 2014. Available at http://www.dailynews.lk/?q = features/president-
showed-world-how-defeat-terrorism-minister-amaraweera.
ePresident’s Speech to Parliament on Defeat of LTTE. Available at http://www.satp.org/
satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/president_speech_parliament_defeatof
LTTE.htm.
fSri Lanka: Military Conference to Whitewash War Crime. Available at http://www.hrw.
org/news/2011/05/23/sri-lanka-military-conference-whitewash-war-crimes.
gFundamentals of Victory Against Terror, Sri Lanka Example. Available at http://www.
priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200908/20090825fundamentals_of_victory.htm.
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